


Approved For Release 2008/10/29 : CIA-RDP86M00886R000800130025-6

The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505



13 September 1984

Dear Bud,

Here is the publication of the GAC report on
arms control violations.

Yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Bill", written in a cursive style.

William J. Casey

The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500



Approved For Release 2008/10/29 : CIA-RDP86M00886R000800130025-6

New York Tribune

NEW YORK, NEW YORK

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Weather
for today

Clear tonight to
Sunday, highs
near 80, lows
near 60.

Rise of a
New Era



FRIDAY, AUGUST 31, 1984

White House may bare Soviet treaty violations

A QUARTER CENTURY OF
SOVIET COMPLIANCE PRACTICES UNDER
ARMS CONTROL COMMITMENTS
1958 - 1983

GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

Title slide from the briefing — based on the highly classified report by the presidential commission — given to, among others, the Senate and House Armed Services committees; the House Intelligence Committee; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and selected senior CIA officers.

'Explosive' study kept from public Slides show history of non-compliance

By Albert L. Weeks
NEW YORK TRIBUNE NATIONAL SECURITY EDITOR

Part 1 of a series
©New York Tribune — 1984
The White House has decided, against the advice of the State Department and the CIA, to release a declassified version of a top secret report on Soviet treaty violations so "explosive" that it has been all but suppressed for nearly a year.

Prepared for President Reagan by 12 highly respected experts, the report documents a quarter-century of Soviet non-compliance affecting the most sensitive security areas of U.S.-Soviet relations. Today, the *New York Tribune* presents the first nine of 29 slides (see page 6A) from a briefing on the report given to groups of congressmen and senior administration security officials.

The revelations contained in the report — portions of which have been obtained by the *Tribune* — plus Soviet flouting of SALT II provisions detected by U.S. intelligence during the 10 months since the report was given to Reagan last

November, add up to a devastating indictment of the whole purpose and rationale of arms-control negotiations with the Soviets.

Administration experts believe that once the facts of the Soviet violations are made known to the public, it is possible that such superpower negotiations in the future will be altered profoundly or abandoned altogether.

Early in his administration, Reagan convened the bipartisan General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament (GAC) and directed it to study the history of Soviet compliance — and non-compliance — with strategic treaties. He relied on this panel rather than on the CIA, because the (see GAC, page 6A)

C-134

GAC

(From page 1A)

agency "under [President] Carter was covering up this stuff," a well-informed intelligence source told *The Tribune*.

Despite demands from Congress, most of the violations never have been made public, nor have the Soviets publicly been confronted with them, according to administration sources.

As well, the White House silence about Soviet treaty violations since November is causing tremors within Republican ranks in the Senate and House and among members of the bipartisan committee that prepared the report.

"The contents of the GAC report are so explosive, Reagan's 'pragmatic' advisers have tried to keep the lid on it," an administration source said.

Both houses of Congress have unanimously passed amendments demanding that the president release to Congress the report prepared by his advisory committee.

The amendments have yet to take effect, since they were attached to the two versions of the 1985 Defense Authorizations Bill, now deadlocked in the joint congressional Conference Committee.

One of the key members of GAC soon will publish an article in which he says that if the United States does not call the Soviets on the violations, the adversary will perceive that our political will is weak. Lack of such a challenge to the Soviets, Dr. Colin Gray will write in the fall issue of *Foreign Policy* magazine, to appear next month, will damage seriously the credibility of our strategic-nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

Pressure to reveal

The Reagan administration again will be under strong bipartisan pressure when Congress reconvenes next week to reveal the GAC findings on the violations. A spearhead comprising about a dozen Republican senators and congressmen — including Sens. John East, R-N.C.; Mack Mattingly, R-Ga.; James

McClure, R-Iddaho; and Jesse Helms, R-N.C.; and Reps. James C. Orr, R-N.J.; and Jack Kemp, R-N.Y. — is expected to appeal urgently to the White House to release more information.

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger reportedly has told Helms that a declassified version of the top-secret report will reach Congress in mid-September.

The Senate and House Republicans backing disclosure say they place, as one source put it, the "day-to-day" security of the United States above partisan politics. Further, this congressional group believes the best rebuttal to the Democrats' attacks on lack of progress in arms control is the GAC report itself. The continuing, daily Soviet violations of agreements, they say, represent a mounting military threat.

Violations, circumventions

The sensitive GAC findings covering 25 years, together with more recent intelligence input about contemporary Soviet violations and circumventions of treaty obligations heretofore kept secret, show that:

- Soviet non-compliance is especially evident in areas of offensive strategic weapons — the kind that could be used for what Soviet military literature calls the "crushing nuclear first strike."

- Soviet actions represent utter violation of specifically stated SALT I-II and Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty prohibitions. The Soviet violations virtually tear up U.S.-Soviet accords on the most crucial points.

- Soviet compliance can be documented only in the area of what GAC calls issues of low-level importance, and in areas where mutual U.S.-Soviet interest in reaching an agreement is stronger than the Soviet motive to violate the given obligation (for example, non-proliferation, nuclear-accident avoidance and hotline communications, the Antarctic treaty, environmental modification treaty, and so forth).

- In addition to the GAC report, there are more violations about which Reagan must report to Congress by Sept. 15 under a congressional mandate. These newest violations — some 12 in all — are particularly threatening and unsettling to U.S. security interests.

ling to U.S. security interests.

- Violations of the Nuclear Test Ban Agreement date back to the Khrushchev period of 1963.

- The establishment of clandestine Soviet Arctic basing of strategic-range Backfire and Bison long-range bombers poses a threat to the "Industrial Triangle" of the continental United States lying just over the North Pole. (Although the latter were mentioned in the Pentagon's annual *Soviet Military Power* booklet issued last March — five red dots showing the northern bases — the size of the violation in Arctic basing abutting North America is more extensive than has been made public up to now.)

- The SALT treaty mandated dismantling of certain strategic weapons systems — that is, down to 2,250 "strategic delivery vehicles" — has been flouted by the Soviet Union, which actually has built up these assets to more than 2,700 strategic vehicles, while the United States has continued to build down below the stipulated level.

In addition, the *Tribune* has learned that:

- The Soviets have been jam-

ming telemetric data collected by U.S. satellite electronic intelligence means; such jamming is prohibited by treaty. Such Soviet interference has been employed to conceal Soviet testing in the ABM mode and ICBM testing.

- Soviet research, development and deployment in sea-based missiles — cruise and ICBM — have been particularly active in the most recent times, and some of these Soviet activities have violated stated SALT parameters.

Politics of disclosure

Some of the president's inner core of political advisers, particularly James Baker and Michael Deaver, evidently have regarded disclosure as a political liability in an election year. They reportedly now have acquiesced to National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane's insistence that covering up the report harms U.S. security, administration sources said.

However, Secretary of State George Shultz, other State Department officials and the CIA, according to a White House source, still oppose releasing even the declassified

(see GAC, page 16A)

GAC

(From page 6A)

fied version of the GAC report, the sources said.

Those advisers close to the president who favor disclosure believe that if the Democrats chose to stir up a controversy over release of the information, it would help rather than hinder Reagan's reelection, for he could demonstrate that what the Republican platform calls the Carter "cover-up" of past Soviet violations now has been rectified.

The congressmen pressing for release of the GAC report believe the administration must be open and candid with Congress and the public over the large-scale Soviet violations, as U.S. security is endangered by Soviet flouting of the treaties. They say it is time to bring what they say is a deplorable situation to the attention of the U.S. public. This would help win support for efforts to redress the strategic-weapons imbalances that

have continued to accrue since the signing of the various agreements.

3 attempts to disclose

Thrice, Congress has passed amendments demanding that the administration disclose report on Soviet treaty violations.

The first was sponsored in the House by Rep. James Courter, R-N.J., and in the Senate by Sens. James McClure, R-Idaho, and Mack Mattingly, R-Ga. This amendment passed both houses unanimously in June. It requires the president to send to Congress an unclassified version of the GAC report within 60 days of the enactment of the 1985 Defense Authorization Bill.

The DAB currently is deadlocked in the Senate-House Conference Committee, meeting to reconcile differences in the two versions of the bill. The key issues of this stalemate are the level of defense spending to be authorized, and unilateral U.S. arms control constraints on the new MX ICBM.

The stalemate probably will require passage of a "stop-gap" Continuing Resolution, to fund U.S. defense programs in the meantime.

The second amendment was sponsored by McClure alone. It passed the Senate by 82 votes. It requires the president to report to Congress on all remaining Soviet arms control violations by Sept. 15, 1984.

An earlier amendment, passed 93-0 in the Senate on Sept. 22, 1983, requiring a presidential report to Congress on Soviet arms control violations up to that time, has yet to be fully complied with.

Members of the GAC

The 12 GAC members appointed by Reagan in 1981 and confirmed by the Senate comprise five Democrats, and seven Republicans and independents. They are:

- William R. Graham — Ph.D. physicist (chairman).
- Colin S. Gray — world re-

known strategic analyst.

- Roland F. Herbst — defense analyst.

• Robert B. Hotz — former editor of *Aviation Week and Space Technology*.

- Eli S. Jacobs — businessman.

• Charles Burton Marshall — foreign policy expert and brother of former Secretary of State George Marshall.

- Jaimie Oaxaca — business-

man.

- John P. Roche — former defense policy adviser to President Johnson.

• Donald Rumsfeld — former secretary of defense, under President Ford.

- Harriet F. Scott — expert on Soviet military doctrine.

• Laurence H. Silberman — former U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia and former deputy U.S. attorney general.

Next: How the Violations Damage U.S. Security

6A / FRIDAY, AUG. 31, 1984

NATIONAL SECURITY

New York Tribune

Reproductions of slides used in highly classified briefings

Joint Chiefs of Staff, security-oriented congressmen and CIA officials heard record of 25 years of Soviet treaty violations

Eight of the 29 slides in briefing shown here; others to appear in next installments

UNCLASSIFIED
GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ARMS CONTROL
AND DISARMAMENT

WILLIAM R. GRAHAM — CHAIRMAN
COLIN S. GRAY
ROLAND F. HERBST
FRANCIS P. HOEBER
ROBERT B. HOTZ
ELI S. JACOBS
CHARLES BURTON MARSHALL
JAIMIE OAXACA
JOHN P. ROCHE
DONALD RUMSFELD
HARRIET F. SCOTT
LAURENCE H. SILBERMAN
UNCLASSIFIED

Membership of the General Advisory Committee, appointed by President Reagan in 1981 and confirmed by the U.S. Senate.

UNCLASSIFIED
TASKING OF GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

- NOVEMBER 19, 1982 MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT
- COMMITTEE ASKED TO REVIEW ARMS CONTROL
 - VERIFICATION
 - COMPLIANCE
 - LESSONS FOR FUTURE AGREEMENTS

UNCLASSIFIED

Tasking instructions for the committee.

UNCLASSIFIED
A QUARTER CENTURY OF SOVIET COMPLIANCE
PRACTICES UNDER ARMS CONTROL COMMITMENTS

REVIEW OF SOVIET COMMITMENTS AND
PRACTICES: 1958 - 1983

- APPROACH
- PRODUCTS
- DEFINITIONS AND CRITERIA
- KEY FINDINGS
- RECOMMENDATIONS
- FURTHER ISSUES

UNCLASSIFIED

Table of Contents for the GAC Report.

UNCLASSIFIED

I. APPROACH FOR THE REVIEW

- COMMITTEE PERFORMED AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW
 - ALL SOVIET ARMS CONTROL OBLIGATIONS SINCE WW-II
 - PREVIOUS STUDIES
 - UNITED STATES DOCUMENTATION
 - SOVIET UNION DOCUMENTATION
 - COMMUNITY-WIDE SUPPORT
 - BRIEFINGS BY A WIDE RANGE OF OFFICIALS
 - USE OF OUTSIDE EXPERTS
 - LIMITED CROSS-CHECKING OF INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

Process by which the committee reached its conclusions: They studied all relevant U.S. and Soviet documents, had access to all levels of government, were briefed by a wide range of officials and experts inside and outside the government, and cross-checked their information as thoroughly as possible.

UNCLASSIFIED

II. PRODUCTS OF THE REVIEW

- REPORT: A QUARTER CENTURY OF SOVIET COMPLIANCE PRACTICES UNDER ARMS CONTROL COMMITMENTS: 1958 - 1983
- LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT CONTAINING RECOMMENDATIONS
- SUMMARY BRIEFING

UNCLASSIFIED

The three elements of the full GAC review of Soviet Violations are:
1) The report itself in two volumes: Vol. 1 — 275 pages, classified TOP SECRET, Codeword; and Vol. 2 — 7 pages, classified SECRET. 2) A letter of recommendations delivered to President Reagan as long ago as Nov. 1983. 3) A summary briefing, built around these classified and unclassified slides.

III. DEFINITIONS AND CRITERIA

- MATERIAL BREACHES OF OBLIGATIONS
 - VIOLATION OF AN AGREEMENT OR TREATY
 - BREACH OF A UNILATERAL COMMITMENT
 - CIRCUMVENTION DEFEATING THE OBJECT OR PURPOSE OF A TREATY
- STANDARDS OF CONFIDENCE
 - HIGH CONFIDENCE — PROBABLE TO CERTAIN
 - REASON FOR SUSPICION — LESSER CONFIDENCE IN FACTS, LAW, OR BOTH

Definitions used to establish a Soviet treaty violation, breach or circumvention. Two criteria were used to separate violations from suspicions of violations. If the evidence was probable or certain, the event was classed as a violation.

**SOVIET BREACHES OF BINDING ARMS CONTROL OBLIGATIONS HIGH
CONFIDENCE IN RELIABILITY OF DATA INTERPRETATION
NON-SALT MATTERS**

SOVIET OBLIGATION	TYPE OF BREACH	SOVIET ACTION	DATES
NUCLEAR TEST MORATORIUM	BREACH OF UNILATERAL COMMITMENT		1961 - 1962
OFFENSIVE WEAPONS IN CUBA	BREACH OF UNILATERAL COMMITMENT		1962
LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY OF 1963	VIOLATIONS	EXTRA-TERRITORIAL VENTING	1965 - PRESENT
OFFENSIVE WEAPONS IN CUBA	BREACH OF UNILATERAL COMMITMENT	DEPLOYING NUCLEAR MISSILE TYPE SUBMARINES IN CUBAN TERRITORIAL WATERS	1970 - 1974
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION OF 1972	VIOLATIONS	FACILITIES EXPANSION, BIOLOGICAL MUNITIONS PRODUCTION, STORAGE, TRANSFER AND USE	1972 - PRESENT
GENEVA PROTOCOL OF 1925	CIRCUMVENTIONS DEFEATING OBJECT OR PURPOSE	TRANSFER FOR FIRST USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST NON-PARTIES	1980 - 1982
MONTREUX CONVENTION OF 1936	VIOLATIONS	TRANSIT OF TURKISH STRAITS BY AIRCRAFT CARRIERS	1974 - PRESENT
HELSINKI FINAL ACT OF 1975	VIOLATIONS	FAILURE TO NOTIFY BEFORE MILITARY EXERCISES	1981 SEPT - 1983 JUNE
CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS CONVENTION OF 1981	VIOLATIONS OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW	USE OF BOOBY-TRAP MINES AND INCENDIARY DEVICES AGAINST CIVILIANS IN AFGHANISTAN	1981 - 1982
BREZHNEV'S SS-20 MORATORIUM	BREACH OF UNILATERAL COMMITMENT	COMPLETION OF LAUNCHER POSITIONS	1982 MARCH - 1983 DEC

These are the two most important charts (above and left) in the series of slides. They enumerate and describe a total of 17 Soviet arms control treaty violations, including violations of the SALT treaties. These criteria were established by GAC for presenting its conclusions, and they are highly respected. The criteria express the GAC interpretation of the intelligence data and international law in each of the 17 cases of Soviet arms control treaty violations.

**MATERIAL BREACHES OF SOVIET ARMS CONTROL COMMITMENTS
SALT MATTERS**

SOVIET OBLIGATION	TYPE OF BREACH	SOVIET ACTION	DATES
INTERIM SALT AGREEMENT OF 1972	CIRCUMVENTION DEFEATING OBJECT OR PURPOSE	DEPLOYMENT OF "MEDIUM ICBMs" (SS-19 AND SS-17)	1972 - PRESENT
INTERIM SALT AGREEMENT, ABM TREATY AND SALT II TREATY	VIOLATIONS	DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT ACTIVITIES IMPENDING VERIFICATION	1972 - PRESENT
ABM TREATY	VIOLATION	DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF NON-PERMANENTLY FIXED ABM RADAR CONTRARY TO ARTICLE V (1) (COMMON UNDERSTANDING C)	1975 -
SALT I PROTOCOL	VIOLATIONS	DEPLOYMENT OF MODERN SUBMARINES EXCEEDING LIMIT OF 740 BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE LAUNCHERS WITHOUT DISMANTLING OTHER ICBM OR SLBM LAUNCHERS	1976 - 1977
SALT II TREATY	PROBABLE VIOLATION	PROBABLE CONTINUED "DEPLOYMENT" OF SS-18 MOBILE ICBM AND LAUNCHERS AT PLESETSK	1979 - PRESENT
SALT II TREATY	PROBABLE VIOLATION	TESTING OF SS-X-25, A SECOND NEW ICBM, CONTRARY TO ARTICLE IV (9)	1983
ABM TREATY	VIOLATION	CONSTRUCTION OF LARGE NON-PERIPHERAL RADAR	1981 - PRESENT

**Weather
for today**
Cloudy, storms
likely, high near
80. Partly cloudy
tonight, low
near 55.

New York Tribune



TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 4, 1984

NEW YORK, NEW YORK

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Study of Soviet treaty violations reveals dangers for U.S. security

The New York Tribune has gained access to the most comprehensive report in 2 decades on Soviet arms pact violations. So potentially damaging are its contents to the proponents of detente and compromise on the side of the West, that the U.S. government thus far has refused to fully disclose the report.

By Albert L. Weeks
NEW YORK TRIBUNE NATIONAL SECURITY EDITOR

Part 2 of a series

©New York Tribune — 1984

In 1969, the Soviet Union established the Department for Strategic Deception (DSC) in the Kremlin, led by then-Marshall Nikolai Ogarkov, who now is chief of the general staff.

In the 14 years since the department was started, it systematically has subverted the arms control

KEY FINDING #2

SOVIETS USE DELIBERATE DECEPTION IN
NEGOTIATIONS

SALT I: REPLACEMENT OF LIGHT SS-11 WITH
"LIGHT" SS-19 ICBM

SALT I: ENCOURAGEMENT OF U.S. UNILATERAL
STATEMENT

LATER REJECTED (STRETCH
YANKEE SUBMARINE)

MBFR: SOVIETS HAVE CONSISTENTLY
UNDERREPRESENTED WARSAW PACT
TROOP STRENGTH BY OVER 200,000 MEN

SALT II: BACKFIRE BOMBER INTERCONTINENTAL
CAPABILITY DENIED

GAC

(From page 1A)

relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, including the first and second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT).

The highly classified report for President Reagan authored by his General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament (GAC) documents 17 material violations of arms control agreements by the Soviets. It also lists 10 more "suspicions" of material breaches. The report has been suppressed quietly, at least since November 1983, by members of Reagan's inner core of advisers, who apparently fear that disclosure would endanger what remains of "détente."

The GAC report, portions of which have been obtained by the New York Tribune, has been the subject of intense interest by administration defense analysts and government consultants, one of whom called the findings "of crucial significance for our nation's defense."

Nine slides from the classified briefing on the report are reproduced on page 7A.

Last week, a White House source said that National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane had won out over Reagan aides Michael Deaver and James Baker, with Secretary of State George Shultz, and ranking CIA officers still arguing against disclosure, when Reagan finally decided to release a version of the report to Congress later this month.

If the White House does release an annotated version of the GAC findings, Congress may finally stop

clamoring for disclosure. Three separate amendments ordering the White House to release the report have been passed, two of them unanimously.

A carefully studied case in point raised by the GAC involves, flagrant violations of the SALT I Interim Agreement and the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. In the former, following the signing of the Interim Agreement, the Soviets illegally deployed the SS-19 "heavy" Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) they were building as the talks on the agreement continued. Secondly, by building a nationwide network of ABM management radar systems, the Kremlin has openly violated the 1972 treaty.

The supporters of disclosure within the White House and Congress believe Reagan would benefit politically in two ways by revealing the Soviet violations. First, disclosure dramatizes the fact that the Soviet Union has stalked out of arms-reduction talks three times in the last year. Second, the extent and nature of the violations are such that the disclosure of the GAC report and later post-GAC intelligence information about additional breaches of agreements would only demonstrate that the United States will have to take additional measures to guard its own security. This implies further defense expenditures, perhaps on a larger scale than was anticipated originally.

Threaten U.S. security

The GAC report states that Soviet treaty circumventions:

- Threaten U.S. capability to defend the United States against a nuclear first strike launched from

the Soviet Union.

- Allow a one-sided Soviet superiority along a number of military parameters, including both conventional and nuclear arms, and all three legs of the strategic U.S. "triad" — manned bombers, ground-based missiles, sea-based missiles.

- Place the United States in a bind of unilateral compliance with U.S.-Soviet agreements, while the Soviets are left free to take advantage of U.S. compliance by tearing up the most sensitive as well as elastic parts of at least 2 dozen arms control agreements reached since 1957.

- Supplement Soviet peace propaganda efforts, tailored to the above Soviet arms violations, to attempt to embarrass the United States with charges of "instigating the arms race" while, in fact, this country merely seeks to redress the growing imbalance resulting from Soviet violations.

Soviet propaganda often is echoed in the U.S. print and broadcast media — for example, when a network news Pentagon correspondent gives viewers the impression that it is the United States that makes the weapons innovations that are later only "copied" by the

Soviets. GAC findings, and the timing of introduction of numerous Soviet weapons, prove that this perception of U.S. arms innovation is false.

- Violate both SALT treaties by the deployment of a brand new multi-warhead strategic missile, the SS-26 (larger than our proposed MX). Because of the power and accuracy of the SS-26, it represents a threat to our retaliatory land-based missile force of Minuteman IIIs.

- Have allowed the Soviets to construct the intercontinental Backfire bomber, a plane, they insist cannot fly beyond their borders.

Jam verification signals

By jamming signals for verifying treaty compliance (e.g., the ABM treaty of 1972), the Soviets may have succeeded partly in concealing further breaches of the ABM Treaty, breaches that informed sources say are under study at this moment by U.S. intelligence.

Despite Soviet interference with telemetry for checking compliance, the United States has discovered that the other side has developed a large supersonic

submarine-launched cruise missile, which has been stealthily — and illegally — adapted to the hulls of a class of permitted Y-Class Soviet submarine.

Another discovery is the Soviet capability to reload at concealed ABM sites, which constitutes a double violation, since only one ABM site per side is permitted. Taken together, reloading of the one and building of illegal additional sites constitute a blatant violation.

These revelations of violations and a statement by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has any "strict obligations to act in accordance with the [SALT] II Treaty," imply that the Kremlin may have had no intention of making even a show of abiding by SALT II. Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States ratified the SALT II treaty.

'We can, but you can't'

Instead, they threw down a gauntlet to the United States as if to say: "See, we're going ahead with our weapons programs and intend to gain superiority over you. But what can you do about it? Your legislators, your public will not stand for the large increases in defense expenditures necessary to keep up with us."

"Meanwhile, the world will see,

by your revelations of our violations, that we are the wave of the future, the mightier of the two superpowers, as the United States begins to occupy second place."

Characteristically, Ogarkov told a group of U.S. congressmen visiting the Soviet Union 5 years ago: "We have superiority over you. You had better get used to it."

Ogarkov's threat is hammered home by the GAC report, which said that not only does the United States lack the long- or short-range strategy for deterring Soviet treaty violations, there are very few ways to counteract the violations.

Saying that quiet diplomacy via "special" channels has not inspired the Soviet Union to abide by its treaties, the report suggests that more formal government moves in the past have had some effect. Specifically, U.S. forthright action during the Cuban missile crisis, and reports supplied to the U.S. media about Soviet use of chemical weapons in Southeast Asia, "yellow rain," resolved both situations, at least temporarily.

A major concern raised by the GAC is that the violations listed may only represent the "tip of the iceberg," because other treaty violations probably have been necessary in order to carry out the known violations.

Next: Are U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements feasible?

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NATIONAL SECURITY

TUESDAY, SEPT. 4, 1984 / 7A

Reproductions of slides used in secret briefings — Part III

Joint Chiefs of Staff, security-oriented congressmen and CIA officials heard record of 25 years of Soviet treaty violations

Nine of 29 slides in the briefing are shown here; nine more will be published tomorrow

KEY FINDING #1

RECURRING PATTERN OF SOVIET VIOLATIONS SINCE 1972

- REVIEW INCLUDES EVENTS OF 1958-1983:
- 26 ARMS CONTROL TREATIES OF THE USSR
 - 12 APPEAR NOT TO RAISE COMPLIANCE CONCERNS
 - 9 INVOLVE "MATERIAL BREACHES"
 - 4 MATERIAL BREACHES OF ORAL COMMITMENTS
 - OF THE 17 "MATERIAL BREACHES":
 - 7 INVOLVE SALT, 10 INVOLVE NON-SALT COMMITMENTS
 - 13 BEGAN IN OR AFTER 1972 (SALT ERA)
 - 10 FURTHER SUSPICIONS OF "MATERIAL BREACH" CONSIDERED UNABLE TO RESOLVE
 - SEVERAL COULD HAVE MAJOR MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE

KEY FINDING #2

SOVIETS USE DELIBERATE DECEPTION IN NEGOTIATIONS

- SALT I: REPLACEMENT OF LIGHT SS-11 WITH "LIGHT" SS-19 ICBM
- SALT I: ENCOURAGEMENT OF U.S. UNILATERAL STATEMENT
 - LATER REJECTED (STRETCH YANKEE SUBMARINE)
- MBFR: SOVIETS HAVE CONSISTENTLY UNDERREPRESENTED WARSAW PACT TROOP STRENGTH BY OVER 200,000 MEN
- SALT II: BACKFIRE BOMBER INTERCONTINENTAL CAPABILITY DENIED

KEY FINDING #3

SOVIETS SIGN AND RATIFY ARMS CONTROL TREATIES THEY ARE PLANNING TO VIOLATE

- BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (RATIFIED)
- SOVIETS EXPANDED BW FACILITIES — 1972-1975
- SALT II (SIGNED):
- SOVIETS FALSIFIED SALT II DATA BASE — SS-19s AT PLESETSK

This chart establishes two important new facts: The GAC found 17 material Soviet arms control breaches; and the GAC found 10 suspicions of material breaches — some having possible major military significance.

This chart lists four examples of Soviet deceptions in arms control negotiations. In the first case, the Soviets told the U.S. that they did not intend to replace light ICBMs with heavy ICBMs. This was prohibited by the SALT I Interim Agreement (Article II). Yet, they replaced their light SS-11 ICBMs with their new SS-19 ICBMs, which they knew to be a "heavy" ICBM.

Secondly, they accepted a U.S. unilateral statement that old missile submarines to be converted to non-missile uses could not be made longer, or could not have missile tubes sticking out of their hulls. The Soviets then went on to violate this U.S. unilateral statement — their apparent acceptance of which seemed to bind them — in both ways.

Third, the Soviets have continuously lied about their troop strength in the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction negotiations since 1973.

Fourth, the Soviet leaders denied that their Backfire bomber had intercontinental capability, when in fact it does have such capability.

Other examples of the Soviets signing an arms control agreement they were planning to violate are the SALT I Interim Agreement, by deploying illegally their SS-19 heavy ICBM, and the SALT I ABM Treaty, by deploying an illegal nationwide network of ABM management radars.

KEY FINDING #4

SOVIET CONCEALMENT AND DECEPTION INCREASING

- IMPEDES VERIFICATION
 - ENCRYPTION
 - CONCEALMENT
 - DECEPTION
- CENTRALLY MANAGED SOVIET PROGRAM

This chart says the Soviet concealment and deception program violates SALT I and II, because it constitutes deliberate interference with U.S. National Technical Means of SALT Verification — interference prohibited by SALT I and II.

KEY FINDING #5

PRIVATE DIPLOMACY INSUFFICIENT TO RESTORE COMPLIANCE

- STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
- HIGH LEVEL DÉMARCHES
- BUT SOME U.S. ACTIONS HAVE BEEN EFFECTIVE
 - MILITARY MEASURES
 - PUBLIC INFORMATION
 - DIPLOMATIC PROTESTS
 - PUBLIC INFORMATION
 - U.N. INVESTIGATION
 - INVOLVEMENT OF ALLIES AND NEUTRAL COUNTRIES

RESOLVED CUBAN
MISSILE CRISIS

STRIKING REDUCTION
OR HALT IN USE OF
LETHAL CHEMICAL
WEAPONS

Although private diplomacy has failed to force Soviet compliance with treaties, government action via the military, the foreign service and public information campaigns resolved the Cuban missile crisis and convinced the Soviets to restrict their use of chemical warfare, such as with "yellow rain" in Asia.

KEY FINDING #6

NO U.S. LONG-RANGE STRATEGY TO DETER SOVIET VIOLATIONS

- U.S. VERIFICATION CAPABILITY
NECESSARY BUT NOT SUFFICIENT
- U.S. OPTIONS OFTEN PLANNED
"AFTER THE FACT"
- U.S. LEFT WITH FEW OPTIONS

The U.S. has no long or short range strategy to deter Soviet violations and very few options to counteract them.

FURTHER SIGNIFICANCE OF RECENT SOVIET BREACHES

- THE SOVIET BREACHES SINCE SALT II APPEAR TO HAVE SEVERAL PECULIAR PROPERTIES
 - INITIATED AT ABOUT THE TIME OF SALT II AGREEMENT
 - DONE IN A FASHION WHICH SHOULD HAVE AT LEAST CAUSED U.S. SUSPICION
 - SOME OF THE APPARENT ADVANTAGES GAINED BY THE RECENT BREACHES COULD HAVE BEEN OBTAINED BY "LEGAL" MEANS
- IN THE OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE, A REASONABLE INTERPRETATION OF SOME OF THE SOVIET BREACHES, INCLUDING PART OF THEIR CONCEALMENT AND DECEPTION PROGRAM, IS THAT THEY ARE MEASURES TO TEST
 - U.S. INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES
 - U.S. POLITICAL PROCESSES RELATIVE TO ARMS CONTROL
- THESE BREACHES AND THE EXPANDING SOVIET NATIONAL CONCEALMENT AND DECEPTION PROGRAM MAY HAVE BEEN A PREPARATION OR A COVER FOR MORE EXTENSIVE VIOLATIONS TAKING PLACE NOW OR TO TAKE PLACE IN THE FUTURE

The most significant point on this chart is that the 17 Soviet violations described in the GAC report are the known, visible "tip of the iceberg," beneath which there may be a whole series of unknown or even more serious violations.

SOVIET CONCEALMENT AND DECEPTION PROGRAM

- ESTABLISHMENT OF KGB DISINFORMATION DEPARTMENT, 1959
- ESTABLISHMENT OF MINISTRY OF DEFENSE DEPARTMENT, 1970 FOR
 - MARSHALL (THEN GENERAL) N.V. OGARKOV
 - LATER BECAME SENIOR MILITARY MEMBER OF SALT I DELEGATION
 - NOW CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF
- LARGE INCREASE IN PROGRAM SINCE SALT I
- PROGRAM INCLUDES BOTH WEAPON SYSTEMS CONSTRAINED BY ARMS CONTROL AND THOSE NOT CONSTRAINED
 - CONCEALMENT OF WEAPONS AND FACILITIES
 - DECEPTIVE CONSTRUCTION AND DECOYS
 - INFORMATION SECURITY (ENCRYPTION, TELEMETRY SUPPRESSION, ETC.)
 - MAY ALSO INCLUDE DUAL PURPOSE COVERS: SUBMARINE TUNNELS FOR BOTH HARDNESS AND CONCEALMENT

This chart describes the Soviet Union's centrally managed program of concealment and deception. It omits the fact that in 1970 the Kremlin's Ministry of Defense established a Department for Strategic Deception (dot with blank space after it) headed by Soviet Marshall N.V. Ogarkov.

COVER AND DECEPTION QUESTIONS

- THE SOVIETS HAVE USED CONCEALMENT AND DECEPTION IN CONNECTION WITH BREACHES OF SALT AGREEMENTS
 - EXAMPLES: MAINTENANCE OF SS-16 AND TESTING OF SS-X-25
- ARE THEY PLANNING TO COVER MORE EXTENSIVE VIOLATIONS?
- ARE THEY PRESENTLY CONDUCTING MORE EXTENSIVE VIOLATIONS?

Further examples of Soviet concealment in connection with breaches of SALT agreements. Examples not listed include: Construction of submarine tunnels; SS-20 concealment; SS-X-24 testing.

Weather for today
Cloudy, breezy and cool. High in 60s. Tonight: clear, quite cool. Low in 50s.

New York Tribune

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Place of a New Era

Arms talks — what are the risks for the U.S.?

Study shows Soviet record of treaty violations

The New York Tribune has gained access to the most comprehensive report in 2 decades on Soviet arms pact violations. So potentially damaging is its content to the proponents of detente and compromise in the West that the U.S. government thus far has refused to fully disclose the findings. This series is based on the report; the slides published on page 4A are from a secret briefing on its contents.

By Albert L. Weeks
NEW YORK TRIBUNE NATIONAL SECURITY EDITOR

Part 3 of a 3-part series
Given the breadth of Soviet violations of arms agreements with

NEWS ANALYSIS

the United States over the past 25 years, does it make sense to negotiate with the Soviets on security

(see GAC, page 4A)

Reagan aide: U.S. has no policy on violations

WASHINGTON, Sept. 4 — A Reagan arms adviser has accused the administration of having no policy to deal with Soviet arms treaty violations and says Washington should scrap existing agreements unless Moscow's behavior changes.

Colin Gray, a leading weapons expert and a member of Reagan's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control, wrote in the upcoming issue of *Foreign Policy* that the United States has unambiguous evidence of Soviet cheating.

"No one who saw the complete technical evidence amassed could doubt that the violations are so significant as to call into question the very notion that the superpowers retain enough common interests in arms control to warrant continuing negotiations," Gray said.

But he said, having publicly accused Moscow of cheating, the administration "seems to have exhausted its level of courage and consensus."

Reagan last January sent Congress a report accusing the Soviet Union of seven violations or probable violations of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, the 1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) and other agreements.

An unclassified version of the report was made public.

But Gray, who heads the private National Institute for Public Policy, said the administration, like its predecessors, "has no policy on

what to do about Soviet treaty violations."

Saying this was due in part to "deep splits" between arms control supporters and hard-liners, he said the administration should tell the American people "that Soviet misbehavior has cast doubt on the wisdom of persisting in arms control."

"At the very least, the United States should be prepared to declare that if Soviet behavior does not change, Washington will no longer abide by the restrictions of SALT II and the ABM treaty," he said.

He said the advisory panel of which he is a member has prepared an even stronger case for Soviet violations than Reagan's report last January.

Gray said the committee's study has not been sent to Congress and administration officials remain reluctant to elaborate on the violations listed in the January report.

As a result, he said, Moscow sees no reason to comply with the 1972 and 1979 agreements and it "continues to modernize its forces across the board in disregard of both pacts."

Gray said the United States "has no business negotiating new arms control agreements unless it has a responsible policy to deal with Soviet cheating on existing agreements."

"To cave in meekly to persisting Soviet violations for fear of accelerating the arms race would constitute a policy of appeasement."

Reuters

GAC

(From page 1A)

matters? Indeed, is it safe for the United States to do so, given what one defense analyst calls the "dangerous" disadvantage into which the United States has fallen via wholesale Soviet circumventions of the ABM Treaty, SALT I and II, nuclear testing and conventional arms treaties going back to 1958?

While it may be true that the United States is in the process of catching up with the Soviets — after years of putting faith in such treaties and Soviet willingness to scale down the arms race — there is no guarantee that the Soviets will desist in their ongoing program to stay ahead. Moreover, 10 possible arms-pact violations by the Soviets so far this year are now under study by U.S. intelligence. That's 10 more than the 17 cited in the classified report to President Reagan of November 1983 from his General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament (GAC).

During the 1960s, Nikita Khrushchev hinted at a pattern of violations planned by the Soviets more than a decade prior to detente and the ABM and SALT I and II agreements. Violations of a variety of other treaties relating to nuclear testing and deploying offensive missiles in Cuba also date back to the Khrushchev years (1959-64). Taken together, they suggest that the Kremlin's decision to use deception against security agreements with the United States is longstanding.

In two major speeches delivered by Khrushchev in 1960 and 1961, the Soviet leader explicitly revealed that the Soviet Union would in the future conceal extra-

missiles and warheads, "dispersing and camouflaging them well." Khrushchev told the Supreme Soviet on Jan. 14, 1960: "We are developing such a system [of backup missiles] so that if some means of retaliation [on the Soviet side] were knocked out, we could always fall back on others and strike the enemy from reserve installations."

The Penkovsky Papers, revealed to the West by military intelligence officer Col. Oleg Penkovsky at the same time as the Khrushchev speech, showed that the Soviets intended to establish the means to shoot down incoming U.S. missiles. The Soviet Union, indeed, deployed the first such ABM system, the "Galosh," before the United States deployed the "Safeguard" ABM, which turned out to be superior to the Soviet system. Once Safeguard was operational, Moscow suddenly suggested abandoning the ABM concept in favor of the U.S.-proposed "MAD" (Mutual Assured Destruction) strategy providing nearly total dismantlement of all ABM sites, actual or intended.

Conceived by Kennedy-Johnson administration non-military-specialist advisers, clustered around Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, MAD was predicated on the assumption that the Soviets would uphold whatever treaties they might sign. While the United States dismantled all ABM sites, the Soviets, relying on professional-military advice, stepped up development of their own ABM, while retaining the option — declined by the United States — of maintaining a functioning ABM site near Moscow.

Meanwhile, under Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov — later to become Leonid Brezhnev's chief of the

General Staff after earlier having been promoted by Brezhnev to Moscow Center to head up the Chief Directorate for Strategic Deception in 1968-69 — the Soviet Union embarked on the ruse of signing the 1972 ABM Treaty and SALT I-II. By these agreements, concluded in various installments during the administrations of Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter, the Soviets sought to gain significant advantages in strategic arms, offensive and defensive (ABM).

Concerted violations

The contents of the GAC report, and intelligence information collected since November 1983 and since the president's own partial revelations in January, show a shocking picture of concerted Soviet violations. The circumventions, according to informed defense analysts, significantly threaten U.S. security at the present time.

Congress has passed three amendments instructing the president to report to Congress on Soviet treaty violations, but none have yet to take effect. Last week, the White House reportedly settled on a mid-September date for a partial disclosure to Congress.

As long as the full extent of the violations is kept from public view, many congressmen and the public at large may continue to press for action on the arms control negotiations, which the Soviets have walked out on three times in the past year alone.

Public opinion polls steadily indicate that this is what the public wants. However, were the facts in the GAC report alone known to the public, opinion might veer away from trusting the Soviets in living up to a whole range of new arms agreements, conventional and nuclear, since their record is one of deception, according to the GAC.

Points to consider

As a bare minimum, some defense analysts suggest, the two superpowers might agree solely to work on agreements that pertain to:

- Defusing potentially dangerous situations that could escalate into full-scale nuclear war — i.e., broadening that part of the SALT I Treaty pertaining to each side keeping the other informed of its policy in crisis situations affecting third parties, while showing a readiness to take measures to defuse those crises pregnant with the danger of nuclear war.

- Improving such emergency communications links as the Hot Line, which actually was upgraded this spring.

- Compliance in the area of unimpaired telemetry (heretofore U.S. telemetry has been impaired by Soviet jamming, encryption, etc.) so that a viable check on Soviet testing can be maintained. In the past, the Soviets have stopped such blocking of U.S. monitoring systems, when confronted with proof, only to begin new ones

(see GAC, page 14A)

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GAC

(From page 4A)

when the opportunity to test new, prohibited equipment presented itself.

- "Very extensive and nationally controlled" Soviet concealment and deception (see accompanying GAC briefing chart). This deception must be publicly raised with the Soviets; if the violations continue, the American public must be informed and countermeasures taken to overcome any Soviet advantage accruing from the discovered violation.

The United States, the GAC report recommends, must deny the Soviets the "benefit of the doubt." Washington will have to assume, as Khrushchev himself stated, that the Soviets will build — if they haven't already — a number of fallback (or "redundant") systems; that they will go ahead with ABM, despite the 1972 treaty; and, that they will complete an already underway "High Frontier," or "Star Wars" defense system.

The U.S. public will have to face the likelihood that truly convincing verification has definite limitations, that missiles (as long as a Pullman car) and warheads (as tall as a man) can be concealed quite easily, even from on-site inspector — a process which the Soviets, in any event, refuse to allow — and that high-flying photo-recon satellites, for all their photographic sharpness, cannot penetrate shrouds and roofs of a size sufficient to cover missiles and warheads.

Soviets seek superiority

The American public will have to be informed that the Soviet Union, as it has consistently maintained in its own past and current military literature, actively seeks superiority, not "parity" as it has alleged since the days of detente, over the United States across the whole range of conventional and

nuclear military forces.

Significantly, in recent weeks, as if to advertise the advantage of such pursuit of superiority, the Soviets have resorted to publicizing their military-testing accomplishments. SALT weapons counts — the tallies of the two superpowers' nuclear arsenals in 1972 and 1979 — are bound to show mounting Soviet military strength. This, too, plays into Soviet hands.

Such advertisements of military power were used in the past by Hitler to intimidate all potential interferers with the Nazis' pursuit of world domination. Soviet propaganda aims to show the world that the United States is not the No. 1 military power any longer. Were this perception to sink in, with regard both to world public opinion and among Americans, there is no telling what intimidatory "psych-war" effect this perception might have on the United States, its allies, and what remains of the truly "nonaligned" world.

Case for disclosure

Bearing all this in mind, the case for full disclosure to the U.S. public of the litany of Soviet violations of arms control agreements is strong for the following reasons:

- The necessity for U.S. development and deployment of defensive weapons systems becomes documented for public (and congressional) consumption and support.

- By confronting the Soviets on their record, the United States demonstrates to the potential enemy that U.S. determination to meet the Soviet challenge is strong and unflagging.

- President Reagan, whether campaigning for re-election or beginning his second term, would be strengthened in his bipartisan effort to build a national consensus around the need to effectively confront and counter the Soviet military threat — an effort that a fullbreasted airing of the violations buttresses.

4A / WEDNESDAY, SEPT. 5, 1984

NATIONAL SECURITY

New York Tribune

Reproductions of slides used in classified briefings: Part III

Joint Chiefs of Staff, security-oriented congressmen and CIA officials heard record of 25 years of Soviet treaty violations

The last 9 of the 29 slides used to illustrate briefings on the GAC report are shown here

EXAMPLE OF VIOLATIONS WITH POSSIBLE BROAD MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE SOVIET OFFENSIVE FORCES

- SOVIETS APPEAR TO HAVE REQUIREMENT FOR LARGE SECURE STRATEGIC RESERVE FORCE:
- U.S. MISSILE ACCURACY IMPROVEMENTS WILL EVENTUALLY THREATEN SILO-BASED RESERVE
- THREE POSSIBLE SOVIET SOLUTIONS MAY INVOLVE VIOLATIONS:
 - MOBILE MISSILES
 - TWO PROBABLE VIOLATIONS CONNECTED WITH MOBILES (SS-16 AND RS-X-29)
 - LARGE CONCEALMENT AND DECEPTION PROGRAM CONNECTED WITH RS-20
 - SOVIETS MAY INTEND TO CONCEAL MOBILE ICBM IN RS-20 FORCE
 - EXTRA STORED MISSILE - ACTIVATED WHEN NEEDED
 - SEVERAL SUSPICIOUS EVENTS
 - EXTRA BOMB FORCE LEVELS
 - LARGE CONCEALMENT AND DECEPTION PROGRAM FOR SURMARINES
 - SOVIET CONCEALMENT AND DECEPTION PROGRAM REDUCING U.S. ABILITY TO ASSESS THAT STRATEGIC STRENGTH

EXAMPLE OF VIOLATIONS WITH POSSIBLE BROAD MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE SOVIET DEFENSE FORCES

- LARGE SOVIET AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM BEING MAINTAINED, IMPROVED NEEDS ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE COMPLEMENT TO BE EFFECTIVE
- SOVIET ARMS CONTROL VIOLATIONS AND SUSPICIOUS ACTIONS INCLUDE:
 - EXPANSION AND IMPROVEMENT OF LARGE FIXED RADAR NETWORK WITH
 - ONE RADAR THAT VIOLATES ARM TREATY
 - RAPID RELOCATION OF A "FLAT TWIN" ARM RADAR
 - ALSO IN VIOLATION OF ARM TREATY
 - USE OF AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM COMPONENTS AT ARM TEST RANGE
 - A SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY PERIODICALLY OCCURRING SINCE 1973
 - A POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF ARM TREATY
- SOVIET ACTIONS ARE CONSISTENT WITH:
 - AN ARM "BREAKOUT" CAPABILITY
 - COVERT USE OF AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS TO ENHANCE ARM CAPABILITY
- U.S. BALLISTIC MISSILE REQUIREMENTS SENSITIVE TO SOVIET ARM CAPABILITY

POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF SOVIET BW/CW PROGRAM

- SOVIETS HAVE APPARENTLY DEVELOPED A WIDE SPECTRUM OF CW AND BW WEAPONS
 - "TAILORED" USE
 - SOME FOR DIRECT ATTACK ON PERSONNEL
 - SOME FOR EXTENDED AREA DENIAL
 - ETC.
- GOVERNMENT OF CHINA VIEW SOVIET CAPABILITY AS SUB-NUCLEAR OPTION AGAINST CPR
- WEST HAS INADEQUATE CAPABILITY TO RESPOND IN KIND
- SMALLER NATIONS BECOMING INTERESTED IN OBTAINING CW CAPABILITY
 - IRAQ MAY BE ONLY ONE EXAMPLE
- SOVIET PROGRAM NOW SEEMS TO BE PURSUING GENETIC ENGINEERING FOR NEW AGENTS
 - NEW, UNIQUE AGENTS POSSIBLE
 - WEST MAY REMAIN IGNORANT OF THEIR PROPERTIES
 - POTENTIAL SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES

Examples of violations with possible military significance involving both Soviet offensive and defensive forces.

This chart describes the dangers of the Soviet Biological Warfare (BW) and Chemical Warfare (CW) program. The Chinese People's Republic (CPR) is especially concerned that the Soviet Union might opt for CWBW Warfare against it, rather than risk nuclear warfare.

STANDARDS OF PROOF

- BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT
 - UNREALISTIC CRITERIA FOR ARMS CONTROL
 - UNLIKELY TO BE POSSIBLE IN MOST CASES
 - NO POLICE OR JUDICIAL AUTHORITY
- SUSPECTED PARTY CONTROL THE EVIDENCE
 - SHOULD SUPPLY DATA TO SHOW INNOCENCE
- U.S. ATTEMPTED TO OBTAIN SUCH DATA IN SS-X-25, SS-16 AND TTR CASES — FAILED
 - SOVIETS USED CONCEALMENT IN SS-X-25 AND SS-16
 - SS-X-25 — ENCRYPTION
 - SS-16 — EQUIPMENT UNDER ROOFS WHEN U.S. INTELLIGENCE PLATFORMS NEAR
 - SNOW TRACKS SHOW ACTIVITY AT OTHER TIMES
- IF SOVIETS USE CONCEALMENT
 - SHOULD DENY THEM BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT
- SOVIET CONCEALMENT AND DECEPTION INCREASING THROUGH SALT PROCESS
 - NOW VERY EXTENSIVE AND NATIONALLY CONTROLLED

This chart describes the standards of proof of Soviet arms control violations used in the GAC Report. It concludes that Soviet concealment strongly suggests that the activities being concealed by the Soviets are violations.

IV. FINDINGS AGREEMENTS WITHOUT COMPLIANCE PROBLEMS

- ACCIDENT AVOIDANCE**
- DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS LINKAGE LINE AGREEMENT OF 1963, AMENDED 1973
 - USSR-U.S. ACCIDENTS AGREEMENT OF 1971 (1 INADVERTENT VIOLATION)
 - USSR-UNITED KINGDOM ACCIDENTS AGREEMENT OF 1973
 - USSR-FRANCE ACCIDENTS AGREEMENT OF 1978
- NONPROLIFERATION**
- NONPROLIFERATION TREATY OF 1968
 - GUIDELINES FOR NUCLEAR TRANSFERS, IAEA INFORMATION OF 1978
 - GUIDELINES FOR NUCLEAR TRANSFERS, IAEA INFORMATION OF 1978
 - PROTOCOL II OF THE TREATY OF TLAQUELOTE (LATIN AMERICAN NUCLEAR FREE ZONE), USSR RATIFICATION 1979
 - CONVENTION ON THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL, USSR RATIFICATION 1982
- OTHER**
- ANTARCTIC TREATY OF 1959
 - OUTER SPACE TREATY OF 1967
 - SEABED TREATY OF 1971
 - CONVENTION ON ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION OF 1977

There are some international agreements that the GAC committee decided the Soviets have complied with.

AVAILABLE SOVIET MOVEMENT TOWARD COMPLIANCE

- SOVIETS HAVE MANY OPPORTUNITIES TO IMPROVE THEIR COMPLIANCE
- TERMINATE ARMS CONTROL RELATED COVER AND DECEPTION ACTIVITIES
- DISMANTLE ABALAKOVO RADAR
- TERMINATE FLAT TWIN DEVELOPMENT
- CEASE USING AIR-DEFENSE EQUIPMENT DURING MISSILE FLIGHTS
- BUILD DOWN SS-19 TO PRE-SALT 1 THROW WEIGHT LEVELS
- DESTROY SS-16 FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT
- TERMINATE DEVELOPMENT OF SS-X-25 (PLK)
- DISMANTLE 36 EUROPEAN SS-20 LAUNCH FACILITIES
- DESTROY BW FACILITIES AND WEAPONS
- IMPROVE NUCLEAR TEST CONTAINMENT
- DECLARE AS-3 (KANGAROO) AS LONG RANGE CRUISE MISSILE
- CORRECT MBFR WARSAW PACT FORCE LEVELS
- NOTIFY UNITED NATIONS OF ALL SPACE LAUNCHES
- MOVE AIRCRAFT CARRIER ACTIVITY FROM BLACK SEA

The basic message of this chart is that the Soviets must give up their strategic superiority over the United States — gained by their SALT violations — in order to come into compliance with the SALT treaties. Restated, the Soviets have gained overwhelming strategic superiority over the United States through their SALT violations, and they thus will be very reluctant to correct these violations.